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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
construe Section 17(1) (a) as incorporating by inference the more liberal 17(1)
(d) test.35
From the foregoing, it is to be concluded that Section 17(1)(a) re-
quires the physical presence of the defendant or his agent within Illinois
and the transaction of the business in question at that time, "and not that
he or his agent tr-jnsact the business outside Illinois, or even from outside
Illinois with independent persons in Illinois."36
35 Ibid., at 628.
3(1 Ibid., at 628.
REAL PROPERTY-NEGATIVE RECIPROCAL EASEMENT
HELD RETROACTIVE WHERE COMMON GRANTOR
REACQUIRED LOT ORIGINALLY CONVEYED
WITHOUT RESTRICTION FOR
COLLUSIVE PURPOSE
Defendant grantor conveyed one lot of his original tract to his brother
without any restrictions as to the property's use. He conveyed the re-
maining lots within an area of two blocks of his brother's lot with restric-
tions that the property was to be used only for dwellings of a value of
$5,000 or more. These deeds were recorded, and subsequently, the grant-
or's brother built a duplex valued at less than $5,000 on his lot. The
grantees, whose deeds contained the restrictions, took no action to enjoin
the brother from building the duplex. The brother then reconveyed the
lot to the defendant, who proceeded to build a trailer camp on the
property. Th,: grantees brought this action to enjoin the grantor's ac-
tivities. The chancellor decreed that the grantor was bound by reciprocal
negative easements as to the entire two blocks in the original tract. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan, the decree was affirmed on
the ground that the grantor was estopped from showing that the recipro-
cal negative easements would be retroactive and, therefore, not binding
on him. Cook v. Bandeen, 356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959).'
The importance of this case lies in the unusual factual situation pre-
sented where a common grantor makes a conveyance without restrictions,
followed by several conveyances with restrictions, and a reconveyance
of the first lot is then made to the common grantor in the hope the prop-
erty will not be subject to the reciprocal negative easements affecting
the other lots.
Generally, a reciprocal negative easement arises when a common grant-
or conveys one lot with restrictions of benefit to all the land retained.
1 The principal case is entitled Brownson v. Bandeen, but was consolidated with and
under the title as given above.
CASE NOTES
The restrictions become mutual and the lands conveyed are subject to
them.2 As pointed out in Allen v. Detroit,8 a reciprocal negative ease-
ment arises if a common grantor conveys out certain portions of his
tract containing building restrictions, the restrictions becoming mutual as
between the grantees and the grantor. In the Cook case the common
grantor conveyed out several lots with a form of building restriction.
It is not important that the restrictions be enforced as between the
grantor and the grantees. A reciprocal negative easement "is not personal
to owners, but operative upon use of the land by any owner having
actual or constructive notice thereof.' 4 Constructive notice, as pointed
out in McQuade v. Wilcox,5 arises when the deeds containing the restric-
tions are recorded. Constructive notice, of course, is not an element in
the instant case because the grantor, being the original formulator of the
restrictions, had actual notice.
Other cases indicate that an attempt by a common grantor to establish
a general scheme by inserting restrictions into the deeds of grantees
results in the creation of mutual restrictions." In Silberman v. Ubrlaub,7
the court found a reciprocal negative easement where the common grant-
or attempted to establish a uniform plan of improvement, restricting the use
of each parcel to residential purposes and setting forth the restrictions
in the deeds.
It would appear, under these examples, that when the grantor in the
Cook case attempted to establish a general plan for all the property with-
in the two blocks, mutual restrictions arose as between present and future
land owners. Under these facts, the grantees would be allowed to enjoin
the grantor from proceeding with the trailer camp installation. The
conveyance by the grantor to his brother was the first in the series of con-
veyances within the two blocks. This lot was not subject to any restric-
tions whereas the subsequent conveyances were. However, reciprocal
negative easements apply only as between the common grantor, the
grantees and subsequent purchasers of the restricted property.8 In effect,
the application of the restrictions, as to the lot in question, would be
2 Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
3 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911).
4 Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 230, 206 N.W. 496,497 (1925).
5 215 Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771 (1921).
6 Saari v. Silvers, 319 Mich. 591, 30 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
7 102 N.Y.S. 299 (1907).
8 Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925); French v. White Star
Refining Co., 229 Mich. 474, 201 N.W. 444 (1924); McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302,
183 N.W. 771 (1921); Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, 139 N.W. 878 (1913); Boyden v.
Roberts, 131 Wisc. 659, 111 N.W. 701 (1907).
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retroactive and the courts have held that a reciprocal negative easement
cannot by its nature be retroactive. 9
Therefore, we are left in a position where a reciprocal negative ease-
ment exists, but should not be enforced because its application to the
property would be retroactive. Thus, the grantor seemingly has a defense
against the use of the mutual restrictions and can thwart the general
scheme for the area.
The fact that the application of the restrictive covenants would be
retroactive does not automatically preclude the grantees from a decree
ordering conformity with restrictions. The defense of retroactivity may
be surmounted if the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.
It appears to be obvious from the grantor's actions that he intended to
enter into a collusive scheme with his brother, the purpose being to avoid
the effects of the restrictions on the original lot.
Basing its findings upon these facts, the court applied the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, precluding the grantor from asserting that the restric-
tions, as they pertain to the original lot, would be retroactive.
Equitable estoppel is a doctrine by which a party is prevented from
asserting his legal rights because he has by acts, words, or silence led
another into a position where he would be prejudiced if the former were
allowed to assert these rights.10
Unquestionably, the grantor by his own acts and words intended to
deceive the grantees by making them believe that the restrictive covenants
applied to all the property within the two blocks, when in fact, the grant-
or had a legal right which, if asserted, would exclude the lot in question
from regulation under the restrictions. In Gosnell v. Roberts," the grantor
made representations to the grantee that an alley was appurtenant to the
property the latter wished to purchase. When the grantor obstructed the
grantee's use of the alley it was shown that the alley was not appurtenant
to the grantee's property. The grantor was estopped from showing this
since it was his own fraudulent and deceitful misrepresentations which
led the grantee to believe the alley was appurtenant.
Reasonable reliance must be placed on the representations if the doctrine
of equitable estoppel is to be applied. 12 This is not present if the party
would have constructive notice that the representations were false.Ia
9Eveleth v. Best, 322 Mich. 637, 34 N.W.2d 504 (1948); Sanborn v. McLean, 233
Mich. 227,206 N.W. 496 (1925).
10 Florida Land Inv. Co. v. Williams, 98 Fla. 1258, 116 So. 642 (1928); Wilder v.
Hinckley Fibre Co., 97 Vt. 45, 122 Ati. 428 (1923).
11 147 Md.625, 128 Atl. 276 (1925).
12 Dahrooge v. Rochester-German Ins. Co., 177 Mich. 422, 143 N.W. 608 (1913).
1a Bell v. Nye, 255 Ill 283,99 N.E. 610 (1912).
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In Bell v. Nye,14 it was shown that a grantee had constructive notice,
for the purpose of denying equitable estoppel, if the conflicts as to where
the title was to be situated were present in a recorded deed. As applied
to the Cook case, the grantees would be deemed to have constructive
knowledge of all the provisions in the first deed to the grantor's brother.
Therefore, they would not be allowed to rely on the grantor's misrepre-
sentations and would be precluded from applying the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel.
However, constructive notice is effective to deny one's right to the
use of equitable estoppel only where the conduct creating the misrepre-
sentations is mere silence. If any affirmative act or statement creates the reli-
ance, equitable estoppel cannot be nullified by constructive notice. 15
The grantor in Cook was an active participant in the transactions affecting
his interest and made several oral statements and overt acts to create the
reliance on his misrepresentations. Equitable estoppel was not, therefore,
nullified since constructive notice had no effect because the affirmative
acts lead to the representations and the reliance thereon.
The lot when first conveyed out was free of any restrictions since
reciprocal negative easements do not ordinarily apply retroactively. The
defendant, in the position of a subsequent purchaser, could therefore use
the land in any manner. However, the defendant had by his representa-
tions, induced the purchasers of other lots to buy, thinking that all the land
was restricted. These representations on his part gave rise to an equitable
estoppel which precluded him from asserting that the restrictions do not
apply to his lot and thus, we find in effect, a reciprocal negative easement
applied retroactively.
14 Ibid.
15 Bean v. Harris, 93 Okla. 10, 219 Pac. 300 (1923); Robbins v. Moore, 129 111. 30, 21
N.E. 934 (1899); Morris v. Herndon, 113 N.C. 236, 18 S.E. 203 (1893).
TORTS-DEFENSE OF ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE HELD
AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH BELOW DEPARTMENT HEAD LEVEL
Petitioner Howard, a United State Navy Captain, was sued for alleg-
edly false and libelous statements. The respondents were officers of the
Employees Association recognized by the Navy in its Boston Naval
Yard. The libelous communique was sent by Howard to various members
of the Department of the Navy and to the Massachusetts congressional
body. Subsequently, the libelous statements appeared in the papers. On
summary judgment, the district court held for petitioner; on appeal the
court of appeals remanded the case, asserting that Howard's claim of
